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We develop a theoretical model of human skill formation and emigration.
We extend the existing brain drain models, by partly endogenizing the hetero-
geneity of individuals, by introducing aspirations. Emigration of an individual
will result in a migration experience, which increases the migrant’s aspirations.
This will induce her to invest more in the education of her children back home.
We find that this aspirations effect increases the average skill level in the so-
ciety for a given migration rate. We show that the optimal migration rate
that maximizes the post-migration skill-rate of the population is higher if we
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1. Introduction
The question of whether or not emigration of skilled citizens is a curse or a blessing for
developing countries has been of great concern in the recent past. Whereas previous
contributions like Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) identified the brain drain as one of the
primary reasons for poverty and lacking growth in countries of the global south, more
recent articles show that the picture is not as bleak as previously imagined.1 Recently
various studies such as Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001) and Stark (2004) have made
the argument that the possibility to migrate to a richer country, where one can earn con-
siderably higher wages, given the necessary skills, will serve as an incentive to invest in
education. With this additional stimulus, it can be shown that emigration can actually
increase the average skill level of the remaining population.
All the existing work that we are aware of assumes that individuals differ in their in-
herent ability, and that this one-dimensional variable is the only source of heterogeneity.
This ability distribution is typically assumed to be completely exogenous and thus not
influenced by the migration prospects. In this paper, we want to establish that it is
not only ability, but also psychosocial capacities that shape an individual’s education
decision. Since these parameters are typically not inherent, but evolve as a result of ex-
perience and social interactions, they will not be exogenous but depend on the migration
history of a household. More specifically, our research aims at establishing a connection
between the more recent brain drain models and the literature on aspirations formation.
This literature defines aspirations as a quality of individuals who pursue a certain goal
with conviction. This capacity is usually thought to form as a result of interactions with
one’s immediate social environment.2
The concept of aspirations has recently attracted a growing interest in the economic
literature. Several articles identify aspirations failure as one possible reason for under-
investment in education in developing countries. Ray (2006), Dalton et al. (2011) and
Bernard et al. (2011) all stress the importance of raising aspirations in order to fight
persisting poverty. We claim that one possible channel to overcome aspirations failure is
migration.
New empirical insight on aspirations formation3 motivates us to augment work by Beine
et al. (2008). We introduce an intergenerational externality on the household level to a
theoretical model of a brain drain. In our model, it is no longer only the aggregate prob-
ability to migrate that determines the education decision of an individual, but also the
household’s migration history. Since aspirations evolve as a result of social interactions,
a migration experience will lead to a revision of the migrant’s prior aspirations. The
subsequent rise in aspirations will lower the perceived intertemporal discount rate for the
migrant and therefore increase the aggregate investment in education. To evaluate the
validity of the assumptions made in the model we use panel data from Indonesia to show
that a migration experience has a beneficial effect on the aspirations of individuals. In
the last section of the paper we use our empirical results to calibrate the model.
We find that introducing aspirations to our model, as a variable that increases the
1For an extensive survey of the literature see Commander et al. (2004)
2See Appadurai (2004)
3Czaika and Vothknecht (2014) and Bo¨hme (2012) both find that aspirations are higher for migrants.
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weight that someone places on future earnings, increases the positive influence that mi-
gration has on skill formation. There are two reasons for this. First, the higher aspi-
rations magnify the original incentive effect of migration. The expected skill premium
that a higher migration rate implies will be larger for aspiring individuals, since they
value future earnings more than non-aspiring people. Second, a higher steady state mi-
gration rate means that it is more likely to have a parent who has a migration experience.
Thereby, a higher migration rate will increase the average aspirations level in the society,
and hence, the average investment in education.
Taken together, these two effects lead to a higher optimal migration rate for every
country. Furthermore, they increase the autarky equivalent migration rate. Below this
benchmark, allowing for migration will lead to a higher average skill-level than under
autarky. This implies that the aspirations effect increases the range of migration rates
for which a country will have a net brain-gain. Our results suggest that omitting the in-
tergenerational household effect of emigration in empirical studies on the effect of skilled
migration on the skill level of sending countries will overstate the negative effect of em-
igration. Beine et al. (2008) study which countries win and loose from emigration. We
show that, depending on the size of the aspirations effect, some countries that were found
to be net losers of emigration could potentially be winners.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we will give a
short overview about aspirations and their influence on economic behavior. In section 3
we present a theoretical model that investigates the implications of aspirations for the
brain drain. In section 4 we give empirical evidence on the influence that a migration
experience has on aspirations and use the estimation results to quantitatively simulate
the importance of aspirations in our brain drain model. In section 5 we conclude.
2. The aspirations concept
An aspiring individual is someone who has a certain goal or dream that she is pursuing
with conviction. The notion of aspirations as a social capacity is still rather new to eco-
nomics. Appadurai (2004) argues that aspirations do not form in a void, but that the
contact and interaction with our peers is essential for the formation of aspirations. An
individual will aspire to a level of wealth, education or social norms that she is confronted
with in her immediate environment. The more diverse this social environment, the more
likely it is that someone will find a desirable and attainable goal to aspire to. Appadurai
points out that in cultures of absolute poverty, individuals will lack this capacity to aspire.
The point he is making is that if all the peers of a poor individual are equally bad off,
than she will not form the capacity to imagine herself better off.
Ray (2006) develops this idea further and investigates the economic implications of such
a culture of poverty in which the poor will accept their destiny. He develops the concept
of an aspirations window, which is composed of the people that influence an individual’s
aspirations. Usually these are the closest peers, such as close family members, friends
and even neighbors. If this window is solely composed of other economically and socially
disadvantaged people, an individual will be unaspiring because of her unawareness of the
possibility of social and economic ascension. Ray (2006) proposes that someone who is
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aspiring towards a better, attainable life will put a certain amount of effort into the real-
ization of this goal, whereas someone who is unaspiring will not. It is important that the
aspirations gap, the distance between where an individual sees herself currently and the
goal she is aspiring to, must be of a reasonable size, in order to affect her behavior. A gap
that is too small, as in poor or segregated societies, will lead to frustration, since there is
no goal worth pursuing. A gap that is larger than what is reasonably attainable is also
unlikely to affect an individual’s behavior, since she will get fatalistic at the prospect of
never being able to attain her goal. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship.
Figure 1: Aspirations gap and corresponding effort; inspired by Ray (2006)
Effort
Aspirations
Gap
Frustration
Fatalism
Ray (2006) further argues that the aspirations failure in poor societies can be the
cause for a self-sustaining poverty trap. The poor will not save or invest in education,
because the improvement in their lives that this could bring about is not considered as
an option. Bernard et al. (2011) state that aspirations in themselves are future-oriented,
meaning that they are not about the satisfaction of immediate needs, but rather about
the achievement of a long-term goal. Furthermore, they are seen as motivators. If an
individual is aspiring to a certain goal, she is willing to spend time and money on the
realization of this goal. In poor societies, the aggregate lack of aspirations will then lead
to a behavior that is not concerned with the pursuit of a better life, but the fulfillment
of instant needs, and can thus for example be associated with a lack of human capital,
which in turn will be detrimental to growth. Wilson and Boldizar (1990) and Bernard
et al. (2011) find empirical evidence that a lack of aspirations will indeed lead to a less
future oriented behavior.
Dalton et al. (2011) formalize Ray’s concept and develop a theoretical model for aspi-
rations failure and poverty traps. In their model, aspirations are shaped by one’s past
successes and failures. Since the poor face greater downside risk, they will be less likely
to put effort into the pursuit of a goal than the rich. This results in a situation where the
poor achieve less than the rich, which will confirm their initial behavior and lower their
aspirations. This will then lead to self-sustaining poverty traps, where poor individuals
exert less effort because of their acquired low aspirations. The authors argue that policy
needs to tackle the belief and aspirations formation of the poor to be successful in fighting
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persisting poverty.
The points made by Ray (2006) and Dalton et al. (2011) have been taken up by a
number of recent empirical studies whose focus is to find ways to increase the aspirations
of the poor. Exposing poor individuals to successful role models from a similar social
background is such a mechanism that is found to have the desired effect. Macours and
Vakis (2008) find that the responsiveness to an asset transfer program would increase if
the test subjects were exposed to a female leader that also participated in that program.
They argue that the proximity to the female leaders increases the aspirations of the test
subjects, which in turn increases their investment and human skill accumulation.
Another analysis looking at the importance of role models has been undertaken by
Chiapa et al. (2012). The authors studied participants in a Mexican anti-poverty pro-
gram and reported higher educational aspirations for children that came into personal
contact with professional medical staff such as doctors and nurses. This suggests that
the children include this highly-trained personnel in their aspirations window.
A different approach that can be found in the literature is the enrollment of individu-
als in interventions that are designed to raise their self-efficacy. Krishnan and Krutikova
(2010) evaluate a program that was specifically designed to foster the psychosocial skills
of disadvantaged children in the slums of Bombay. In the course of the program, par-
ticipating children are enrolled in activities that are meant to boost their non-cognitive
abilities. The study finds that aspirations, as well as self-efficacy and self-esteem, grow
significantly as a result of the intervention.
Similarly, Wydick et al. (2013) investigate the effects of international child-sponsorship
programs on the schooling outcomes and job-prospects of the sponsored individuals. They
find that the long-term enrollment and participation in such a program has a significantly
positive effect on children’s aspirations, by exposing them to an encouraging and opti-
mistic environment. It is then shown that this increase in aspirations improves their
educational attainment.
Bernard et al. (2014) run a randomized experiment, in which they show a motiva-
tional video to inhabitants of poor villages in Ethiopia. This video shows success stories
of previously poor individuals, who have all managed to greatly improve their lives by
showing perseverance, reliability and determination. They find that subjects that saw
the video experience a significantly higher increase in their aspirations, compared to a
control group that watches a placebo video. Six months after the video intervention, they
find that actual behavior has also changed for the test subjects. Their children’s school
enrollment and savings behavior has increased significantly. Furthermore, there seem to
be spillover effects on other villagers that haven’t seen the video, but have heard about
it from their peers.
This literature shows that increasing aspirations is vital in order to help the poor to
overcome their condition. We identify an additional channel through which aspirations
failure can be overcome: migration. We argue that migration will have a beneficial effect
for the aspirations formation of an individual for at least two reasons. First, migration
allows an individual to broaden her horizon and to meet new people. This is equivalent
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to a widening of the aspirations window. The more people an individual knows, the more
likely she is to know someone who has a lifestyle that she considers worth aspiring to.
Second, migrants usually move to a destination that is wealthier than their place of origin
and often differs substantially in culture and norms. This means that the migrant will
probably be surrounded by individuals who have a lifestyle that is different from and
more luxurious than the one of her domestic peers. The migrant might aspire to these
new social and economic norms that she discovers while being abroad.
The fact that migrants, but also their family in the source country, adapt their social
and cultural values as a result of migration, has been pointed out in several papers that
treat the transfer of norms. Spilimbergo (2009) demonstrates that democratic values are
adopted by migrants and then promoted in their home countries upon their return. Beine
et al. (2013) show that birthrates of source countries will adapt as a result of migration
flows to destinations with different fertility norms. Interestingly, this adaption does not
require return migration, which suggests that strong cultural links between the migrants
and their home country persist.Migration is also found to have an impact on political
aspirations. Lodigiani and Salomone (2012) find that political participation of women
in sending countries increases as a result of migration streams to countries that have a
greater female political empowerment. Migrants witness the foreign political norm and
transmit it to their home country.
Our finding, that aspirations increase as a result of an exposure to a different economic
environment is closely linked to the idea of an international transfer of norms. In the
following section we formalize this idea in a theoretical model, and show its implications
for the brain drain.
3. Theoretical Framework
Consider a small open economy where each household consists of a parent and her child.
This economy represents a poor country, where aspirations are initially low and intertem-
poral discounting is high.4 Each individual lives for two periods. In the first period, youth,
an individual will invest in education if her parent decides that she should do so. In the
second period, adulthood, all youths become parents of one child and make the education
decision for the child. At birth, each individual is endowed with one efficiency unit of
labor, and can invest in education in order to increase its labor force to h > 1 units.
Individuals differ in their ability, which is inversely related to their perceived cost for
education ci. This perceived cost can be interpreted as the time that is needed in order
to achieve a high-school diploma. The more time a child needs to spend on her education
in order to achieve a degree, the less time she can spend on work.
ci follows the cumulative distribution function F (ci) and the density function f(ci) and
is defined on R+. We assume that a child’s inherent ability, and therefore the perceived
education cost, is independently distributed of her parent’s ability.5
4The basic setup of this model is inspired by Beine et al. (2008).
5 This assumption will become important in the course of our analysis, because the parent’s ability
will indirectly influence the child’s education investment through the probability that the parent is
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If an individual pursues education, she earns wt − ci in the first period of her life. In the
second period, her effective units of labor will have increased to h and her income will
change accordingly to wth. Unskilled individuals will earn wt in both periods.
We assume, as in Cunha and Heckman (2007), that parents make the education deci-
sions for their offspring out of altruistic motives. They are assumed to perfectly know the
ability of their children, and can therefore judge the cost and benefits of education for
their children. We assume that a parent’s aim is to maximize the expected discounted
lifetime earnings of her child, net of the perceived education cost. If a parent decides
that her child should pursue education, this can be seen as an investment of the parent,
because during youth children only contribute wt − ci to the household’s income. The
higher the perceived cost, the lower is the effective income in the first period. Without
migration, a parent invests in her child’s education if
wt − ci + (1− δ)hwt+1 ≥ wt + (1− δ)wt+1 (1)
In this setting without migration, the perceived cost benchmark for which parents will
just invest in education is then
ci ≤ c˜t = (1− δ)wt+1(h− 1) (2)
where δ is the perceived intertemporal discount rate for non-aspiring parents.
We include intertemporal discounting in our model, because the perceived discount
rate is closely related to aspirations and poverty. The fact that the poor are exposed to a
considerably higher amount of risk in their day-to-day lives than the wealthy has gained
considerable interest in the recent economic literature. The lack of insurance or savings
as well as the insufficient funds to purchase weather resistant crops can be reasons for
this. Banerjee and Duflo (2007) and Banerjee et al. (2011) give several striking examples
that illustrate the considerable risk-exposure of the poor. Vargas Hill (2009) argues that
this high perceived amount of risk of the poor will have a considerable effect on their
production decisions. The author shows that poorer households with low risk-preferences
are less likely to invest in cash-crops, such as coffee, even if their expected long-run return
is higher than that of traditional crops. As argued earlier, individuals in poor societies are
also likely to have low aspirations. The lack of aspirations manifests itself in a disregard
for long run goals and a higher valuation for the fulfillment of imminent needs.
For these two reasons, future expected earnings should be heavily discounted in our
model. At a high δ, investments in education become less attractive, because skilled
workers earn higher wages only in the second period of their lives, whereas the initial
perceived education costs ci have to be paid in the first period. The next step is to
extend the model and allow for migration.
aspiring. High-ability parents are more likely to be educated and thus to have a migration experience,
since migration is more likely to be possible for the skilled.
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3.1. Migration
We now assume that in the second period of their lives, after becoming a parent, skilled
workers can emigrate to a higher wage destination with an exogenous probability.6 For-
eign wages w∗t are assumed to be significantly higher than domestic wages, w
∗
t > wt. We
assume that there are no costs associated with emigration. However, an inclusion of the
costs does not alter our results qualitatively. Since foreign wages are significantly higher,
an individual will emigrate with certainty if she gets the opportunity to do so. Migration
is thus not a choice variable, but can be seen as a random shock to the income of the
individual.
As argued in Docquier and Marfouk (2000) and Beine et al. (2008), educated individuals
are more likely to emigrate. We adopt this assumption and normalize the probability
that an unskilled individual emigrates to p = 0. The emigration probability for skilled
individuals is denoted by p and is the same for all the educated. This is a reasonable
assumption in our model, where only one education regime exists. In a world where
more than one education level can be achieved, it would be likely that the emigration
probability is increasing in the skill level. Our assumption also implicitly indicates that
the ability level is unobservable for the visa authority, and that education therefore is the
only variable that influences the authority’s choice.
A parent will then decide to invest in her child’s education, if the expected discounted
lifetime earnings of the child, including education costs, are higher if it is skilled.
wt − ci + (1− δ)
(
(1− pt+1)hwt+1 + pt+1hw∗t+1
) ≥ wt + (1− δ)wt+1 (3)
The perceived costs to education for a child have to be below a benchmark value c˜,
otherwise the parent will not invest in the education of her offspring.
ci ≤ c˜t = (1− δ)
(
wt+1(h− 1) + pt+1h(w∗t+1 − wt+1)
)
(4)
It can be seen that c˜t is increasing in h. The higher the increase in effective work units as
a result of education, the more attractive it becomes to invest in skills. Furthermore, c˜t
is also increasing in pt+1. Since wages are higher abroad, and migration is only possible
for the skilled, a higher migration probability increases the expected skill premium, and
leads to a higher education-cost benchmark.
In the previous brain drain models, the only source of heterogeneity were differences
in the inherent individual ability and budget constraints. We introduce aspirations as
an additional source of heterogeneity. We have suggested earlier, and will show in the
empirical section, that migration increases the aspirations of the migrants. Thus, if a
parent has emigrated, she is said to have a migration experience and her aspirations
will increase by γ, compared to a non-migrant. As mentioned before, empirical evidence
suggests that increased aspirations will lead to higher educational attainments. There
are at least three possible ways of introducing aspirations to our model, such that the
6We assume that migrants will leave their offspring behind. This might seem strange, given our simpli-
fying assumption of one parent per child, but in reality, children have two parents. Often, the head
of the household emigrates to earn money for the family, while the rest of the family stays behind.
The education decisions will still be carried out by the head of the household, even if she is abroad.
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skill rate of children from aspiring households are higher. First, one could think of an
aspirations-induced change of preferences. Second, children of aspiring parents can be
assumed to have systematically lower perceived costs for education. Third, aspirations
could lead to a higher valuation of future earnings, lowering the inter-temporal discount
rate. We choose the last option, because it has been pointed out in the aspirations lit-
erature that aspiring individuals have a more future-oriented behavior and are willing to
spend time and money in the pursuit of their goals. They believe themselves capable
of altering their own destiny, which distinguishes them from other poor individuals who
have an aspirations failure. Some recent studies such as Wilson and Boldizar (1990) and
Bernard et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that aspirations are fundamental for
future-oriented behavior.
The way in which we incorporate this in our model is straightforward. Aspiring in-
dividuals will have a lower perceived discount rate, whereas parents who do not have a
migration experience are non-aspiring, and will therefore put a high discount rate δ on
possible future earnings. The aspiring parent will thus be more future oriented, and puts
a larger weight on the second period earnings of her child. It becomes more important
for the parent that her child will have a better life when it is grown up. Migration thus
creates an intergenerational externality, since it influences the future of the child through
the increased aspirations of her parent.
The aspiring parent will invest in the education of her child, if the following holds.
wt − ci + (1− δ)(1 + γ)
(
(1− pt+1)hwt+1 + pt+1hw∗t+1
) ≥ wt + (1− δ)(1 + γ)wt+1 (5)
The higher aspirations γ lead to a change in the perceived cost benchmark.
ci ≤ c˜t,γ = (1− δ)(1 + γ)
(
wt+1(h− 1) + pt+1h(w∗t+1 − wt+1)
)
= (1 + γ)c˜t (6)
This benchmark is strictly higher than for non aspiring households. Migrants will thus
also invest in education if their children are less able than what would be required for
non-migrant families.
What implications does this have for the brain-drain? We assume that a fraction pi
of the population has a parent who has a migration experience and is therefore aspiring.
Imposing that there are no binding budget constraints, which implies that every individual
who chooses education over work can do so, the aggregate pre-migration education rate
in the economy in period t can then be calculated as
Ha,t = (1− pit)F (c˜) + pitF ((1 + γ)c˜)) (7)
The probability that one’s parent has a migration experience depends on the probabil-
ity that this parent is educated herself, Ha,t−1, and the current migration rate for skilled
individuals pt. This probability is then calculated as pit = Ha,t−1pt.
In order to asses the influence that migration has on the brain drain in the long run,
we want to investigate how a change in the exogenous migration probability will influence
the steady state education rate. In the steady state, wages, the migration probability
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and education rates remain constant over time. The steady state education rate is then
Hssa = (1− piss)(1− F (c˜)) + pissF ((1 + γ)c˜)
= F (c˜) + piss(F ((1 + γ)c˜)− F (c˜))
= F (c˜) +Hssa p
ss(F ((1 + γ)c˜)− F (c˜))
Hssa =
F (c˜)
1− pss(F ((1 + γ)c˜)− F (c˜))
(8)
Remembering that c˜ depends positively on p, it is clear that Hssa depends positively
on pss. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, the possibility to emigrate
will increase the expected skill-premium, because skilled work earns considerably higher
wages abroad. This is the classical argument for a brain gain, the incentive effect, as it
has often been identified in the literature. The second channel that drives this positive
relationship between the steady state migration rate and investment in education is the
aspirations effect. If the steady state emigration rate is high, the possibility to have a
parent that has a migration experience is higher, and therefore it is more likely that the
parent will be aspiring. This effect is visible in the denominator. The bigger the aspira-
tions effect γ, the higher the positive influence of the emigration rate on education will be.
However, we are not only interested in the incentive effect that migration has on ed-
ucation. Our ultimate aim is to asses whether migration will increase or decrease the
post-migration skill ratio. This rate is calculated as
Hp,t =
(1− pt)Ha,t−1
1− ptHa,t−1 (9)
which, in the steady state becomes
Hssp =
(1− pss)Hssa
1− pssHssa
=
(1− pss)F (c˜)
1− pssF ((1 + γ)c˜)
(10)
It is evident that this average post-migration skill level is strictly increasing in the aspi-
rations effect.
∂Hssp
∂γ
=
(1− pss)pssc˜f((1 + γ)c˜)F (c˜)(
1− pssF((1 + γ)c˜))2 (11)
Even though the possibility to migrate increases the incentives to invest in education,
it also depletes the stock of skilled workers. The subsequent question then becomes under
which circumstances skilled emigration leads to a brain drain, and what the role of aspi-
rations in this context is. We will focus on the steady state only.7 In order to determine
whether migration will lead to a net brain drain or gain, and thus whether migration is
good or bad for a country, we have to investigate the influence that migration has on this
7From now on we drop the superscript ss in our analysis. All variables of interest are now assumed to
be in steady state.
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post-migration skill rate.8 Taking the derivative of (10) with respect to p, we get
∂Hp
∂p
=
−F (c˜)(1− F ((1 + γ)c˜))(
1− pF ((1 + γ)c˜))2
+
(1− p) ∂c˜
∂p
(
f(c˜) + p
(
(1 + γ)F (c˜)f((1 + γ)c˜)− F ((1 + γ)c˜)f(c˜)))(
1− pF ((1 + γ)c˜))2
(12)
It can easily be shown that the first term is negative, whereas the second term is
unambiguously positive. As argued in Beine et al. (2008), the possibility for a beneficial
brain drain exists if the derivative above is positive for p = 0. That means that a transition
from a state of autarky to very restricted emigration would increase the post-migration
skill level. In this case, there will be a positive emigration rate, which results in the same
average post-migration skill-level as autarky. As a first part of our analysis, we focus
on the effect that an intergenerational aspirations effect has on this autarky-equivalent
emigration rate.
Proposition 1. If the aspirations effect increases the weight that aspiring individuals
put on the future and assuming that ci ∼ U(0, 1), the aspirations effect increases the
autarky-equivalent migration rate and thus the range for which migration is considered to
be better than autarky.
Hp,γ(p0|γ=0) > Hp(0) (13)
where p0|γ=0 is the autarky-equivalent emigration rate without aspirations effect, for which
the autarky skill-ratio equals the ex-post emigration skill-ratio.
Proof. With ci ∼ U(0, 1) and a model without aspirations, the emigration rate for which
the skill ratio is identical under autarky and migration fulfills
(1− p0|γ=0)Ha(p0|γ=0)
1− p0|γ=0Ha(p0|γ=0) = (1− δ)w(h− 1) (14)
where the RHS is the education rate under autarky. We can then calculate p0|γ=0 as
p0|γ=0 =
h(w∗ − w)− w(h− 1)(1− (1− δ)w(h− 1))
h(w∗ − w)(1− (1− δ)w(h− 1)) (15)
We want to show that at this emigration rate, the skill ratio in the economy will be higher
8We assume that due to productivity spillovers of education and aspirations failure, the education rate
in the economy is lower than optimal. Therefore, an increase in the education rate will be described
as being ”better”for the economy.
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than under autarky, if we account for the aspirations effect.
Hp,γ(p0|γ=0) > Hp(0)
(1− p0|γ=0)(1− δ)(w(h− 1) + p0|γ=0h(w∗ − w))
1− p0|γ=0(1− δ)(1 + γ)(w(h− 1) + p0|γ=0h(w∗ − w)) > (1− δ)w(h− 1)
(16)
Setting in (15) for p0|γ=0 and rewriting9, we obtain
γh(w∗ − w) (1− δ)w(h− 1)
1− (1− δ)w(h− 1) > 0 (17)
which is fulfilled by the assumption that h > 1 and that ci ∼ U(0, 1)10. Q.E.D.
If a country has an effective skilled migration rate that is below the autarky-equivalent,
it will benefit from migration. The proposition above states that accounting for the aspi-
rations effect increases the range of the migration rate, for which a country can be seen
as such a net-winner of migration. The bigger γ, the bigger the magnitude of this effect.
Hence, accounting for the aspirations effect when quantifying which country has a net
brain drain or gain will potentially11 increase the number of net winners. If a positive
autarky-equivalent emigration rate exists, there must also be an optimal emigration level,
which maximizes the average skill level.
We now proceed by showing that this optimal migration rate, which maximizes the
post-migration skill ratio, is also increasing in aspirations. We will first calculate the
first-order condition to determine the optimal skilled emigration rate. Then we will use
the implicit function theorem on the first order condition to show that the optimal skilled
emigration rate is increasing in aspirations.
We set equation (12) equal to zero and define this first order condition as a function
of the migration rate and the aspirations effect.
∂Hp
∂p
≡ η(p∗, γ)
= −F (c˜)(1− F ((1 + γ)c˜)
+ (1− p∗)∂c˜
∂p
(
f(c˜) + p∗
(
(1 + γ)F (c˜)f((1 + γ)c˜)− F ((1 + γ)c˜)f(c˜)))
!
= 0
(18)
where p∗ is the optimal migration rate.
9See Appendix A.
10(1 − δ)w(h − 1) is the autarky education cost benchmark for which investments in education will be
made. It has to be smaller than one if ci ∼ U(0, 1).
11With a continuum of countries, it would definitely increase the number of net-winners at the margin.
Since in reality there is a discrete number of countries, it depends on the actual size of the aspirations
effect, whether or not it will shift some net-looser countries on the net-winner side.
11
As argued earlier, the first term of (18) is negative, whereas the second is positive.
For small enough migration rates and sufficiently large differences between foreign and
domestic wages, ∂c˜/∂p will be large enough to ensure a net brain gain. If an optimal
migration rate exists, that is if ∂η/∂p < 0, then we can show that the optimal skilled
migration rate is increasing in aspirations by showing that ∂η/∂γ > 0.
Proposition 2. Assuming that ci ∼ U(0, 1), the optimal skilled migration rate is increas-
ing in the aspirations effect.
∂p∗
∂γ
> 0 (19)
where p∗ is the migration rate that maximizes the post-emigration skill-ratio.
Proof. From the implicit function theorem, we know that ∂p∗/∂γ = −∂η/∂γ
∂η/∂p
. ∂η/∂p < 0
is a necessary condition for p∗ to be a local maximum. It is thus sufficient to show that
∂η/∂γ > 0.
∂η
∂γ
= F (c˜)f
(
(1 + γ)c˜
)
c˜
+ (1− p∗)p∗ ∂c˜
∂p
(
f
(
(1 + γ)c˜
)(
F (c˜)− f(c˜)c˜)+ f ′((1 + γ)c˜)F (c˜)(1 + γ)c˜) (20)
For ci ∼ U(0, 1) the expression simplifies with F (c˜) = c˜ and f(c˜), f((1 + γ)c˜) = 1. For
uniformly distributed perceived education costs, the equation above thus changes to
∂η
∂γ
= c˜2 > 0 (21)
The proposition above states that for uniformly distributed perceived education costs,
the optimal migration rate will be increasing in the aspirations effect. The higher the
impact of a migration experience on the increase in aspirations γ, the higher the optimal
level of emigration.
The aspirations effect works through two distinct channels. First, the negative effect
of emigration is weakened because a higher steady state migration rate increases the
probability that one’s parent has a migration experience. This implies that more people
will have aspiring parents if migration is higher, which means that a higher fraction of
the population has a higher education cost benchmark. Second, aspirations magnify the
incentive effect of the skilled emigration rate. A higher skilled emigration rate means
that the expected returns of education are higher. This effect is stronger for aspiring
individuals, because, compared to the non-aspiring, they give a higher weight to expected
future earnings. This means that the higher aspirations are, the bigger the impact of the
incentive effect will be, and the more pronounced the positive impact of migration on the
aggregate educational investment.
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3.2. Robustness of theoretical results
The proofs we have conducted above required the assumption that the perceived educa-
tion costs follow a uniform distribution. We made this assumption, because it is very
common in the brain drain literature. For example, Beine et al. (2008) and Mountford
(1997) have used uniform distributions in their models. Is it realistic to assume that
perceived costs are uniformly distributed? Most data suggests that intelligence quotient
testscores, as a proxy for unobservable inherent ability, seem to follow a normal distribu-
tion.12 Even if we do not know exactly how different intelligence quotients translate into
different magnitudes of perceived education costs, this finding suggests that perceived
costs could also be approximated by a normal distribution, rather than by a uniform
distribution.
Would our findings concerning the aspirations effect still be valid under an alternative
ability distribution? Rewriting (20), we see that the aspirations effect will increase the
optimal skilled migration rate, if
c˜
(1− p∗)p∗ ∂c˜
∂p
+
f ′
(
(1 + γ)c˜
)
f
(
(1 + γ)c˜
) (1 + γ)c˜ ≥ f(c˜)c˜− F (c˜)
F (c˜)
(22)
This equation will be fulfilled under some requirements on the distribution function.
First, the variance around the benchmark education cost c˜ must be sufficiently high, such
that
(
f(c˜)c˜ − F (c˜))/F (c˜) does not become to big. With a strong concentration around
c˜ the density would otherwise be too high. The aspirations effect thus works better if
there is a large variety of different abilities in the society. Second, f ′
(
(1 + γ)c˜
)
should be
positive or at least not strongly negative. The density of people with higher perceived
costs should thus be higher than that of people with low costs. The aspirations effect
works on those who would otherwise not choose to invest in education. If the density
is increasing, more people will change their education decision as a result of an increase
in aspirations.13 Third, if p∗ is small or close to one the aspirations effect gets stronger.
This implies that the aspirations effect will be larger for countries that have otherwise a
small incentive effect.
4. Estimation and Simulation
The simulation of our model requires a numerical approximation of the migration-induced
increase in aspirations. However, the empirical literature on this subject remains scarce
and does not provide any suggestions with respect to the magnitude or overall importance
of the proposed effect. The main problem is the limited data availability since only few
data sets include questions on aspirations and migration at the same time. The Indone-
sian Family Live Survey (IFLS) constitutes an exception. Czaika and Vothknecht (2014)
use the IFLS and discover a significant correlation between migration and the aspirations
gap. Their analysis offers interesting insights but does not fully exploit the potential of
the dataset. We extend their analysis by focusing on the problem of endogeneity to come
closer to a causal interpretation of the association between migration and aspirations.
12See e.g. Shaywitz et al. (1992)
13With Ha < 0.5, this will be fulfilled for the normal distribution. See graph in Appendix B.
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Making full use of the panel structure of the data we overcome time invariant unob-
servable characteristics of individuals by emphasizing the importance of fixed effects and
difference in difference estimations. Our results suggest that the migration experience of
an individual is positively associated with an upward shift in aspirations. This empirical
exercise and the resulting coefficients provide an indication of how to parameterize the
simulation of our model.
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics
The IFLS is a panel household survey that is representative of around 80% of the Indone-
sian population.14 Since the questions that are relevant in order to measure aspirations
have only been introduced recently to the survey, we limit our analysis to the third and
fourth wave (compiled in 2000 and 2007). The survey keeps track of the internal mi-
gration of all household members aged 15 years or more. There are only few recorded
incidents of international migration. However, this should not pose a problem since in-
ternal migration does expose the migrant to a new socioeconomic environment as does
international migration. The intensity of the effect will most likely depend on the socio-
cultural difference between origin and destination. In both cases the migrant will revise
her own goals and ambitions. It is reasonable to assume that the sociocultural gap will be
even larger for international migration. Therefore, if we find that internal migration has a
significant effect on aspirations, the relation should also hold for international migration
and might even be stronger.
The survey captures the migration experience in the last observation period of indi-
viduals, only if they had lived in a different village for more than 6 months. In order
to be able to identify the impact of migration we also narrowed our analysis down to
individuals who did not migrate before 2000. This provides us with a sample of 12,092
individuals present in each wave who where between 15 and 80 years old in 2000 (Table
1). Although there are only few instances where this is relevant, we decided to keep only
migrants who moved for reasons related to labor or education, i.e. we exclude marriage
induced migration and whole household migration. Based on these adjustments, the na-
tional migration prevalence in our sub-sample stands at around 16 % in 2007. Migrants
are on average 33 years old compared to non-migrant who were on average 45 years old
(not reported in Table 1). About one in five migrants has a higher education degree and
95% of them can write Indonesian. This is quite different from non-migrants where only
78% of all individuals can read and only 7% hold a higher education degree.
Aspirations can be measured in several ways, since the concept can be cultural or
socio-economic. A question concerning the desired years of schooling for an individual’s
offspring is a type of aspirations measure, as is the commitment to a certain saving behav-
ior. The IFLS provides us with a set of questions that allow us to construct a measure for
the economic aspirations gap. Participants were asked to assess their subjective current
economic well-being, relative to the rest of society, on a 6 step ladder.
Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step), stand
the poorest people, and on the highest step (the sixth step), stand the richest
14See Strauss et al. (2009)
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people.
On which step are you today ?
They were also asked where on this ladder they see themselves in the near future.
On which step do you expect to be in one/five years from now?
This forward looking evaluation of the respondents’ future is equivalent with what is
generally considered as aspirations. The simple difference between the forward looking
evaluation and the assessment of her current situation is the aspirations gap our analysis
focuses on.15
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for both waves
2000 2007
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Individual characteristics
Age 35.43 14.54 42.75 14.49
Gender (male=1) 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50
Married (yes=1) 0.67 0.47 0.76 0.42
Household head (yes=1) 0.32 0.46 0.44 0.50
Education & household size
No education 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32
Years of education 7.62 3.92 7.82 4.04
Household size 12.01 5.38 11.96 5.37
Migration and aspirations
Migration prevalence - - 0.16 0.37
Current wellbeing 2.91 0.78 2.85 0.80
Aspirations 3.24 0.91 3.47 1
Aspirations gap 0.34 0.61 0.62 0.75
Observations 12,092 12,092
Table 1 shows the average current well-being, aspirations and aspirations gap for all
individuals in both years. In 2007 migrants had a higher aspirations gap (0.79) than
non-migrants (0.59). This is not driven by the assessment of current well-being which is
2.91 and 2.84 for migrants and non-migrants respectively (not reported).
It must be noted that between 2000 and 2007 a small adjustment of the aspirations
question was undertaken. The authors of the IFLS changed the time horizon of the
aspirations from one year to five years. This modification of the question is unfortunate
for comparisons in the level of the aspirations gap. It can be seen that there is an increase
in the mean aspirations gap for both groups from 2000 to 2007 for which the change in
the time horizon is a probable explanation. The change in the question does not affect
the distribution of the evaluation of the current economic well-being of individuals (see
graph 3a) but does shift the distribution as expected in the forward looking evaluation
(see graph 3b). For our purposes this does not pose a problem, since the fixed effects
estimation that we perform measures the difference in the change in the aspirations gap,
15We also used ratios of aspirations and current situation assessment of individuals as a measure for the
aspirations gap and came largely to the same qualitative conclusions.
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Figure 2: Distributions
(a) Distribution of current well-being (b) Distribution of aspirations
not the level. The adjustment of the question would only be problematic if migrants
understood the question differently than non-migrants, i.e. they processed the changed
horizon of the question systematically different. There is no reason to believe that such
a systematic bias exists.
4.2. Empirical Approach
We explore the influence of migration on aspirations both at the individual as well as at
the household level. Our standard estimation equation looks as follows:
Aijt = α + β1Mijt + β2Cijt + εijt (23)
where Aijt is the aspirations gap of individual i, in household j at time t. Mijt is a
binary migration indicator and Cijt is a vector of observable individual characteristics
such as age, gender and education but also the assessment of the current well-being. We
include the latter to control for possible level effects. We first approach the data with
simple OLS to explore the basic relationship between aspirations and migration. The
central problem in this setup is the endogeneity of migration. More precisely, unobserved
characteristics of the individual might be driving both her aspirations gap as well as her
decision to emigrate. We have the big advantage to be able to control for unobserved
fixed characteristics by using fixed effects estimation based on the two waves of the IFLS.
The fixed effects estimation helps us to come closer to a causal interpretation of the
relation between migration and aspirations. This is important since the correlation be-
tween migration and aspirations could go in both directions. More aspiring individuals
are forward looking and are ready to act in order to shape their own future. Migration is
one way to achieve this. Therefore, migrants are likely to have higher aspirations at the
time they decide to emigrate. To be able to isolate the effects of migration we limit our
analysis to households that had no migrants before 2000.
In the fixed effects setup the identification of the effect of migration on aspirations
is based on the inter-temporal variation of both the aspirations gap and the migration
behavior of individuals. Equation (23) is therefore reduced to:
∆Aij = b+ ∆Mij + ∆eij (24)
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This approach controls for fixed group effects, i.e. effects that are common to all
groups between the two periods. The fixed effects approach also nets out fixed individual
effects, i.e. time invariant individual characteristics. It is reasonable to expect that in the
context of Indonesia the distribution of households with specific characteristics is partly
exogenous. This is due to the government initiated Transmigration program that has
been in place in Indonesia since 1902.16 One of the main goals of the program was to
populate uninhabited regions of Indonesia and to counterbalance the increasing urban-
ization. Within the Transmigration program that moved more than a quarter of a million
people per year, a random element can be found. The program provided free farm land
and housing in the periphery of Indonesia, as well as free transport and free food and
fertilizer for the first year. But most importantly, the free farm land was allocated by
lot.17 This implies that the productivity and quality of farmland was independent of the
families’ characteristics. Households might have opted into the Transmigration program
without knowing the economic benefit this decision would provide. Consequently some
households could be considered randomly distributed.
This particularity of Indonesia can however not remove the doubt about the causal
effect of migration on aspirations since there is still a chance that unobservable variable
factors influence both the dependent and the independent variable at the same time. We
therefore also employ an instrumented variable strategy and propensity score matching
to evaluate our fixed effects results. The instruments we use to identify the effect of
migration on aspirations are the gender distribution and birth order of siblings within
households. Our identifying assumption is that geographic mobility will strongly depend
on the composition of households but the gender composition of siblings and the position
in the birth order should not have significant effects on the change in aspirations. Rainer
and Siedler (2009), for example, document that due to intergenerational responsibilities
at least one adult child will remain geographically close to take care of the elderly. The
same pattern has been documented by Abramitzky et al. (2013). They also point out
that birth order could be an extremely important factor for individual migration. We
build the birth order based on the first period of observation (2000). It is therefore time
invariant and will drop in the fixed effects estimation. However, the share of male sib-
lings in the household that have reached working age (+15) varies over time. We keep the
effect of being the first born by interacting the share of male siblings and the first born
dummy. Hence our identification will run through the change of the share of male siblings
in the household and its interaction with the first born dummy for each individual. The
validity of our instruments rests on the exclusion restriction that siblings do not differ
systematically with regard to their propensity to migrate except with respect to their
quasi-random birth order.
The first stage of our instrumented fixed effects estimation shows clearly that an in-
crease in the share of male siblings reaching working age is having a negative impact on
the likelihood to migrate. However being the firstborn changes the picture entirely. The
oldest sibling is significantly more likely to migrate due to an increase in the share of male
siblings. All covariates included in the estimation predict migration in the first-stage as
found in other studies. For example, we observe an increased probability to migrate of
individuals in larger households and of individuals with a higher education. With respect
16See Hugo (2006)
17See Kebschull (1986)
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to the statistical strength of the instruments we conduct various tests. First, the first
stage F-Test is slightly below the critical value of 19.93 for a 10% bias but above the
value of 11.59 for a 15% bias of the instrumented estimator as proposed by Stock and
Yogo (2005). This suggests that our instruments are reasonably strong.
Another common approach to evaluate the unconfoundedness of the two comparison
groups is propensity score matching. Although we are controlling for a number of covari-
ates in all estimations this does not ensure that the linearity assumption of the comparison
is satisfied. More precisely, if migration depends strongly on the covariates and if the
average value of the covariates is quite different between the two groups, we should not
compare migrants and non-migrants. To address this issue we follow Heckman et al.
(1998) and build a comparable synthetic control group based on a nonparametrically
derived propensity score estimate.
4.3. Estimation Results
In Table 2 we present the benchmark regression results. The standard OLS displayed
in rows one and two shows positive but only borderline significant coefficients for the
migration dummy. The coefficient size roughly reflects the findings reported by Czaika
and Vothknecht (2014). This suggests that in the cross-section there is a significantly
positive correlation between the aspirations gap and migration. Looking at the included
covariates we observe that the aspirations gap decreases with age and that gender does
not seem to play a significant role. We also observe that married individuals display a
significantly more positive outlook than unmarried individuals, and that education and
skills represented by the years of education and the ability to read are positively corre-
lated with the aspirations gap.
In a second step we look at between effects, random effects, and finally fixed effects
regressions, exploiting the full potential of the panel dataset at hand. A Hausman Test
suggests a systematic bias in the random effects model and leads to the conclusion that
the fixed effects model is suited best to answer our research question. It is interesting
to observe that only marital status and education seem to have a statistically significant
impact on the aspirations gap independently of the econometric specification. The last
row of Table 2 contains our preferred estimation specification. Migrants experience a
significantly higher increase in their aspirations gap than non-migrants between 2000 and
2007. Since the mean change in the gap between 2000 and 2007 was 0.2845, the size of
the coefficient of our migration indicator is also economically important.
To check concerns about the importance of changes in income vis-a-vis the exposure
to a new environment, we also included income and a wealth index based on a principal
component analysis (PCA). The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show only a slight
decrease of the strength of the migration effect. As a second robustness check we split the
sample into households with a more than median increase and less than median increase
in income between 2000 and 2007. The results displayed in columns 3 and 4 do not
change the picture. Both these robustness checks suggest that income is not the driver
of the observed effects.
We also evaluated the assumption of common trends by using random assignment of
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the migration status to non-migrants. Using this randomly assigned dummy we should
not observe an effect that is different from zero if our difference in difference estimates
are unbiased. Obviously for this estimation true migrants were excluded, which reduces
the sample size. We report the results of these tests in columns 5 and 6. Independent
of the stratification used for the random assignment we find no effect that suggests any
problems with the assumption of parallel trends.
In Table 4 we address the concern of variable unobserved variables that drive the ob-
served effect of migration on the aspirations gap. As outlined before we use the share of
male siblings in the household and the interaction of this share with the first born status
for each individual. As reported in column 1 of Table 4 the change in the composition of
siblings in the household is not able to predict the subsequent migration behavior of in-
dividuals. However when interacting the change in the composition of siblings with birth
order we find that this combination of variables serves as a good instrumental variable to
predict subsequent migration. The results in column 2 repeat the previous finding that
migration seems to have a strong causal impact in the aspirations window of individuals.
The large size of the instrumented coefficient stems from the fact that the subpopulation
which reacts to the exogenous stimulus of our instrument is rather limited: the effect is
driven by individuals heading the birth order of the household.
Based on the procedure proposed by Heckman et al. (1998) we also implement a non-
parametric propensity score estimation. This method uses the observed characteristics
to match members of both the treatment and control group, i.e. migrants and non-
migrants, based on a nonparametrically generated weight. These characteristics include
current economic well-being, age, gender, martial status, education and ability to read
as well as the position of the individual in the household and the household size. We
exclude individuals that have propensity scores outside of the region of common support.
The result of this approach is reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. It corroborates the
effects suggested by our benchmark regressions even though the effect is slightly higher
with 0.121.
To assess the spillover effect of migration of an individual on all other household mem-
bers we also conducted the analysis at the household level. For this purpose we only kept
individuals who did not migrate but lived in a migration household. The uninstrumented
fixed effects estimation results of this exercise show that it is primarily young household
members whose aspirations are positively affected by migration. For migrant household
members that are 25 years of age or younger the aspirations gap increases by 0.1029
between between 2000 and 2007 compared to individuals who do not live in migrant
households. Although mostly positive this effect is not statistically significant for other
age cohorts. Still, this suggests that even if the education decision wasn’t taken by the
head of the household, as we assume in our model, but by the children themselves, an
aspirations effect would probably still lead to an increase in the average skill rate.
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Table 2: Benchmark regressions aspirations gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS BE RE FE FE
2007 2007 (no trend) (with trend)
Migration .0312 .0377* .0559** .0808*** .0834*** .0848***
Current wellbeing -.2062*** -.2181*** -.1540*** -.1892*** -.2355*** -.2350***
Age -.0094*** -.0084*** -.0058*** -.0058*** .0333*** -.0099
Gender (male=1) 0.259 0.201 -.0030 -.0113 / /
Married (yes=1) 0.0371** 0.0390** .0517*** .0644*** .0907*** .0930***
HH head (yes=1) -.0659*** -.0637*** -.0246* -.0164 .0061 .0067
Years of education .0198*** .0239*** .0193*** .0206*** .0160*** .0158***
Reads Indo .0483*** .0603*** .0432*** .0490*** .0624* .0626*
HH laborforce size 0.0013 0.0025* .0020** .0022*** .0118 .0141
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes / /
Observations 12,092 12,092 24,184 24,184 24,184 24,184
Notes: Authors calculation based IFLS3 and IFLS4; Dependent variable is aspirations gap. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1; Standard errors clustered at the household level.
4.4. Counterfactual simulation
We perform a numerical simulation, assuming a uniform distribution for the perceived
education cost, for different magnitudes of the aspirations effect to get an idea of the
quantitative implications. The graphs are based on the theoretical model presented in
chapter 3 and the empirical results from the previous chapter to calibrate the model.
Since the fixed effects estimator represents our preferred estimation, we take the FE
point estimate of the aspirations gap as a benchmark value for the aspirations effect. The
estimator tells us that the aspirations gap for migrants increased by 0.0848 units com-
pared to non-migrants. This represents γ and will be used as a lower bound to calibrate
our counterfactual simulation. Since our survey mainly covers interregional migration, it
might be that the migration experience of an actual international migration has a more
important impact on aspirations than what we measured. We thus also run the simula-
tion for an aspirations effect that is 50% stronger (γ = 0.127), in order to compare the
implications of a possible higher impact of international migration.
Figure 4 depicts the pre- and post-emigration proportion of skilled individuals. As
expected, a higher aspirations effect results in more investment in education, which in
turn increases the post-emigration human capital. Figure 5 shows the derivative of the
post-emigration skill rate with respect to the emigration rate. The intersection of the
graphs with the x-axis identifies the optimal emigration rate, which maximizes the ex-post
skill proportion. It can be seen that an aspirations effect of 0.0848, as we find it in the
data, increases the optimal emigration rate considerably, in this example from 16% to
almost 20%. Using a more optimistic estimate for the aspirations effect of 0.1272, the
optimal migration rate increases to 21%. 18
18We have used a rather cautious guess for the intertemporal discount rate, setting δ = 0.4. This was
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Table 3: Fixed Effects - Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Including Including Low High Random placebo Random placebo
wealth log change in change in assignment assignment
(PCA) income Income income (Not stratified) (Stratified)
Migration .0696*** .0822*** .0891** .0799** .0071 .0016
Observations 23,971 23,971 11,766 11,994 20,330 20,330
Note: Authors calculation based IFLS3 and IFLS4. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p <
0.1; Standard errors clustered at the household level; Estimation setup is the same as in the benchmark. Controls include
current economic well-being, age, gender, education, household head dummy and household size.
Table 4: Fixed Effects - Alternative Approaches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV IV Propensity Propensity Score‡
(Change in Ratio (Firstborn interacted score‡ (Kernel on
of male siblings) with ratio) (Kernel) common support)
Migration 3.9429 1.3351*** .125*** .121***
CDF .107 12.681 / /
Observations 24,184 24,184 24,184 24,024
Note: Authors calculation based IFLS3 and IFLS4. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p <
0.1;. ‡ Standard errors for the treatment effect and regression treatment effect are computed using a bootstrap with 500
replications; CDF are Cragg-Donald test statistic of the first stage.
As we have seen in the empirical part, aspirations are a somewhat blurry concept that
is hard to quantify. Furthermore, the survey did not provide us with an estimator for the
actual influence of aspirations on education decisions. The examples above are therefore
only meant to clarify the possible implications that aspirations could have for the brain
drain. However, the results suggest that the effect is sizable even for small aspirations
increases due to a migration experience.
done so that we do not get overly optimistic results. Decreasing δ to 0.3 almost doubles the aspirations
effect in our simulation. See Appendix C for an illustration.
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Figure 4: Effect of aspirations on the pre and post-emigration skill proportion
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Note: The following values were used for the simulation. h = 1.5, δ = 0.4, w = 1, w∗ = 1.3
γ1 = 0 ( ), γ2 = 0.0848 ( ), γ3 = 0.1272 ( )
Figure 5: Effect of aspirations on optimal emigration rate
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5. Conclusion
The brain drain literature of the recent past has been arguing that a small amount of
emigration might actually be beneficial for the sending country, since it increases the in-
centives to invest in education. However, this literature has only focused on the incentive
effect of the aggregate emigration probability.
In this paper we propose that the positive incentive effect of emigration is even stronger
than previously assumed, because of an intergenerational externality of a migration ex-
perience. We consider the positive aspirations effect that emigration has on the migrant.
We find that an aspirations effect will increase the autarky-equivalent skilled emigration
rate, and thus the range of migration rates, for which a country benefits from skilled
emigration. Furthermore, the optimal skilled emigration rate is found to be increasing
in aspirations. In the empirical part of this paper, we show that emigrants experience a
significantly higher increase in aspirations, compared to non-migrants. Having lived and
worked in a different location for a while changes the goals and values that an individual
aspires to. Our empirical results suggest that the central assumption of our model is
justified and provide a rough estimate of the parameter needed to simulate our model
quantitatively. The simulation of the model shows that neglecting aspirations leads to a
sizable underestimation of the beneficial effect of migration in the country of origin.
These insights about the relationship between aspirations and the brain drain provide a
promising starting point for further research. First and foremost, more panel data on the
relationship between migration, aspirations and education is needed in order to quantify
the actual impact of the aspirations effect on the overall brain drain. Since aspirations
are still a somewhat blurry concept that can be measured in several dimensions, it is
important to develop reliable survey questions to measure aspirations such that they
can be compared quantitatively across cultures and across time. Second, studies which
calculate the net brain drain for different countries should incorporate the aspirations
effect. This would help to gain knowledge about how the brain drain develops in the long
run if the intergenerational linkages discussed in this study are taken into account.
23
Appendices
A. Rewriting equation (16)
We rewrite equation (16) by multiplying with the denominator of the left hand side. We
then get
(1− p0|γ=0)(1− δ)
(
w(h− 1) + p0|γ=0h(w∗ − w)
)
>
(1− δ)w(h− 1)− p0|γ=0(1− δ)2(1 + γ)w(h− 1)
(
w(h− 1) + p0|γ=0h(w∗ − w)
) (25)
We now subtract (1 − δ)w(h − 1) and divide both sides by p0|γ=0 and (1 − δ). This
simplifies the equation to
(1− p0|γ=0)h(w∗ − w)− w(h− 1) >
− (1− δ)(1 + γ)w(h− 1) (w(h− 1) + p0|γ=0h(w∗ − w)) (26)
which can be written as
h(w∗ − w)− (p0|γ=0h(w∗ − w) + w(h− 1)) (1− (1− δ)(1 + γ)w(h− 1)) 0 (27)
Setting in (15), some terms cancel out, and we obtain equation (17).
B. Normally distributed education costs
With a normal distribution, the density is increasing in c˜ as long as Ha < 0.5. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, the aspirations effect is likely to be greater in situations where only a
minority of the non-aspiring population would invest in the education of their children.
Figure 6: Normally distributed perceived education costs
f(ci)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ha(c˜)
c˜ ci
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C. Counterfactual simulation with low delta
Figure (7) shows an example for a counterfactual simulation where we decreased δ to 0.3.
There are two main effects of this.
• The optimal migration rate increases considerably for all levels of aspirations. When
not accounting for the aspirations effect, the optimal migration rate is now 22%
compared to 16% for δ = 0.4. This is intuitive, because a lower discounting implies
weighing future income more. The low discountrate thus leads to a magnification
of the incentive effect of the possibility to emigrate on the education decision.
• The aspirations effect becomes larger and the gaps between a moderate and a high
aspirations effect increase. For a γ of 0.848 as we find it in our estimation, the
optimal migration rate increases to 26% and for γ = 0.127 to 30%. This is due to
the multiplicative form of aspirations that we assume. If the initial discountrate
is low, the increase in the weighting of future earnings that aspirations imply, is
magnified.
Figure 7: Counterfactual for lower discount rate
(a) Effect of aspirations on the pre and post-
emigration skill proportion
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(b) Optimal emigration rates
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Note: The following values were used for the simulation. h = 1.5, δ = 0.3, w = 1, w∗ = 1.3
γ1 = 0 ( ), γ2 = 0.0848 ( ), γ3 = 0.1272 ( )
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